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The influenza virus continues to evolve, and
new antigenic variants (drift strains) emerge
constantly, giving rise to yearly epidemics. In
addition, strains to which most humans have no
immunity appear suddenly, and the resulting
pandemics vary from serious to catastrophic.
Influenza viruses are unique among respira-
tory tract viruses in that they undergo considerable
antigenic variation. Both surface antigens of the
influenza A viruses undergo two types of variation:
drift and shift (1). Antigenic drift involves minor
changes in the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuramini-
dase (NA), whereas antigenic shift involves major
changes in these molecules resulting from
replacement of the gene segment.
The Reservoirs of Influenza A Viruses
Aquatic birds are the reservoirs of all 15
subtypes of influenza A viruses. In wild ducks,
influenza viruses replicate preferentially in the
cells lining the intestinal tract, cause no disease
signs, and are excreted in high concentrations in
the feces (up to 108.7 50% egg infectious doses/g)
(2). Avian influenza viruses have been isolated
from freshly deposited fecal material and from
unconcentrated lake water, which indicates that
waterfowl have a very efficient way to transmit
viruses, i.e., by fecal material in the water supply.
Since a large number of susceptible young ducks
are hatched each year throughout the world,
many birds are infected by virus shed into water.
This would explain the high incidence of virus
infection in Canadian ducks, particularly juve-
niles, when up to 30% can shed virus before fall
migration. Transmission by feces also provides
a way for wild ducks as they migrate through
an area to spread their viruses to other
domestic and feral birds (3).
The avirulent nature of avian influenza
infection in ducks and wading birds may result
from virus adaptation to this host over many
centuries, which created a reservoir that ensures
perpetuation of the virus; therefore, ducks and
wading birds may be occupying an important
position in the natural history of influenza
viruses. Influenza viruses of avian origin have
been implicated in outbreaks of influenza in
mammals, such as seals (4), whales (5), and pigs
(6), as well as in domestic poultry (7).
Evolutionary Pathways for Influenza
Viruses
Studies on the ecology of influenza viruses
have led to the hypothesis that all mammalian
influenza viruses derive from the avian influenza
reservoir. Support for this theory comes from
phylogenetic analyses of nucleic acid sequences of
influenza A viruses from a variety of hosts,
geographic regions, and virus subtypes. Analyses
of the nucleoprotein (NP) gene show that avian
influenza viruses have evolved into five host-
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specific lineages: ancient equine, which has not
been isolated in over 15 years; recent equine; gull;
swine; and human. The human and classic swine
viruses have a genetic “sister group” relationship,
which shows that they evolved from a common
origin. The ancestor of the human and classic
swine virus appears to have been an intact avian
virus that, like the influenza virus currently
circulating in pigs in Europe, derived all its genes
from avian sources (8,9).
Studies on the NP and other gene lineages in
avian species show separate sublineages of
influenza in Eurasia and the Americas, indicating
that migratory birds moving between these
continents (latitudinal migration) have little or no
role in the transmission of influenza, while birds
that migrate longitudinally appear to play a key
role in the continuing process of virus evolution.
Phylogenetic analyses of amino acid changes
show that avian influenza viruses, unlike
mammalian strains, have low evolutionary rates
(8). In fact, influenza viruses in aquatic birds
appear to be in evolutionary stasis, with no
evidence of net evolution over the past 60 years.
Nucleotide changes have continued at a similar
rate in avian and mammalian influenza viruses;
however, these changes no longer result in amino
acid changes in the avian viruses, whereas all
eight mammalian influenza gene segments
continue to accumulate changes in amino acids.
The high level of genetic conservation suggests
that avian viruses are approaching or have
reached optimum, wherein nucleotide changes
provide no selective advantage. It also means
that the source of genes for pandemic influenza
viruses exists phenotypically unchanged in the
aquatic bird reservoir. The most important
implication of phylogenetic studies is that the
ancestral viruses that caused the Spanish flu in
1918, as well as the viruses that provided gene
segments for the Asian/1957 and Hong Kong/
1968 pandemics, are still circulating in wild
birds, with few or no mutational changes.
Emergence and Reemergence of “New”
Influenza A Virus in Humans
Over the past two and a half centuries, 10 to 20
human influenza pandemics have swept the globe;
the most devastating, the so-called Spanish flu of
1918 to 1919, caused more than 20 million deaths
and affected more than 200 million people. Both
pandemics probably originated from aquatic birds.
Since the first human influenza virus was
isolated in 1933, new subtypes of human type A
influenza viruses have occurred: H2N2 (Asian
influenza) replaced H1N1 in 1957, Hong Kong
(H3N2) virus appeared in 1968, and H1N1 virus
reappeared in 1977. Each of these new subtypes
first appeared in China, and anecdotal records
suggest that previous epidemics also had their
origin in China. Serologic and virologic
evidence suggests that since 1889 there have
been six instances of the introduction of a virus
bearing an HA subtype that had been absent
from the human population for some time.
Three human subtypes of HA have appeared
cyclically—H2 viruses in 1889, H3 in 1900, H1
in 1918, H2 again in 1957, H3 again in 1968,
and H1 again in 1977. Phylogenetic evidence
indicates that a totally new H1N1 virus of
avian origin (not a reassortant) could have
appeared in humans or swine before the 1918
influenza and replaced the previous human
virus strains. Whether the virus was first
introduced into humans and then transmitted
to pigs, or vice versa, remains unknown. The
reappearance of the H1N1 Russian 1977
influenza virus remains a mystery.
How Are Influenza Viruses Spread?
Avian influenza viruses in wild aquatic birds
are spread by fecal-oral transmission through the
water supply (10); initial transmission of avian
influenza viruses to mammals, including pigs and
horses, probably also occurs by fecal contamina-
tion of water. Scholtissek has postulated that the
use of fecal material from ducks for fish farming
in Asia may contribute to transmission of avian
influenza viruses to pigs (11). Another direct
method of transfer is by feeding pigs untreated
garbage or the carcasses of dead birds. Raising
pigs under chicken houses and feeding them dead
avian carcasses has been observed on rare
occasions in the United States; H5N2 influenza
virus was isolated from pigs living under chicken
houses in Pennsylvania during the outbreak in
1982. Both pigs and poultry are commonly raised
on the same commercial farms. From the
perspective of the control of interspecies
transmission of influenza, this is undesirable, for
it may facilitate interspecies transmission of
influenza viruses. After transmission to pigs,
horses, or humans, the method of spread of
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Emergence of H5N2 Influenza Viruses in
North America
In 1983 an H5N2 influenza virus infected
chickens and turkeys in Pennsylvania and
became highly pathogenic for poultry. Virologic
and serologic studies provided no evidence of
transmission to humans (12). The virus was
eventually eradicated by quarantine and exter-
mination of more than 17 million birds at a direct
cost of more than US$60 million and an indirect
cost to the industry of more than US$250 million.
More recently, a highly pathogenic H5N2
influenza virus emerged in domestic chickens in
Mexico (7). In October 1993, egg production
decreased and deaths increased among Mexican
chickens in association with serologic evidence of
an H5N2 influenza virus. H5N2 virus was
isolated in May 1994. By the end of 1994, the
virus had mutated to contain a highly cleavable
HA, but remained only mildly pathogenic in
chickens. Within months, however, it had become
lethal in poultry. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA
of H5 avian influenza viruses, including the
Mexican isolates, indicated that the epidemic
virus had originated from the introduction of a
single virus of the North American lineage into
Mexican chickens (Figure 1). This virus was
eradicated from chickens by quarantine and use of
inactivated vaccine.
Live Bird Markets and the Epidemiology of
Influenza
The chicken/Pennsylvania (H5N2) influenza
outbreak in 1983 to 1984 demonstrated that live
bird markets play an important part in the
spread of influenza viruses in avian species. In
1992, Senne et al. (13) described live bird markets
as the “missing link in the epidemiology of avian
influenza,” for H5N2 viruses had been isolated from
live birds until 1986. These H5N2 viruses caused
subclinical infection in chickens in the markets, as
did H5N1 viruses in live bird markets in Hong Kong
in 1997 (Figure 2). Moreover, ducks in the markets
in the United States were infected with many
different subtypes of influenza A viruses, including
H2N2 viruses related antigenically to the Asian/57
(H2N2) viruses that have disappeared from humans.
The live bird markets in the United States
continue to harbor many influenza viruses. The
ancestor of the H5N2 influenza virus that caused
the epidemic in Mexico in 1993 to 1995 was
isolated from market birds, and H7NX subtypes
are still found in live bird markets. These viruses
are potentially pathogenic for chickens and are of
Figure 1. Molecular changes associated with emer-
gence of a highly pathogenic H5N2 influenza virus in
chickens in Mexico. In 1994, a nonpathogenic H5N2
influenza virus in Mexican chickens was related to an
H5N2 virus isolated from shorebirds (ruddy turn-
stones) in Delaware Bay, United States, in 1991. The
1994 H5N2 isolates from chickens replicated mainly
in the respiratory tract, spread rapidly among
chickens, and were not highly pathogenic. Over the
next year the virus became highly pathogenic, and the
hemagglutinin acquired an insert of two basic amino
acids (Arg-Lys), possibly by classic recombination and
a mutation of Glu to Lys at position – 3 from the
cleavage site of HA1/HA2.
Figure 2. The emergence of H5N1 influenza in Hong
Kong. It is postulated that a nonpathogenic H5N1
influenza spread from migrating shorebirds to ducks by
fecal contamination of water. The virus was transmitted
to chickens and became established in live bird markets
in Hong Kong. During transmission between different
species, the virus became highly pathogenic for chickens
and occasionally was transmitted to humans from
chickens in the markets. Despite high pathogenicity for
chickens (and humans), H5N1 were nonpathogenic for
ducks and geese.439 Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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great concern to chicken farmers in the
northeastern United States.
The depopulation of live bird markets and
farms in the New Territories of Hong Kong
(December 29, 1997) stopped the spread of H5N1
influenza viruses. An important lesson can be
learned from this action in Hong Kong. Live
bird markets are potential breeding grounds
for both avian and mammalian influenza
viruses. Serologic monitoring of the chickens in
Hong Kong markets for H5N1 influenza virus
was an important first step in stopping the
spread of the viruses. An even more important
step would be to reduce the opportunity for
interspecies transmission by marketing chick-
ens separately from other avian species.
The Index Case of H5N1 in Humans in
Hong Kong
On May 21, 1997, a 3-year-old boy from Hong
Kong died in an intensive care unit in Hong Kong
on the fifth day of his hospitalization, with a final
diagnosis of Reye syndrome, acute influenza
pneumonia, and respiratory distress syndrome
(14). He had no indications of other underlying
disease, including immunodeficiency or car-
diopulmonary disease. From a tracheal aspirate,
we isolated an influenza virus in MDCK cells but
were unable to grow any pathogenic bacteria
from respiratory specimens. In hemagglutination
inhibition assays, the virus did not react with
ferret antisera to recent isolates of human and
swine subtypes.
Hemagglutination inhibition assays using
antisera to 14 H subtypes showed that the isolate
was an H5 influenza A virus. Neuraminidase
inhibition tests, using antisera to nine N
subtypes, indicated that the neuraminidase was
of the N1 subtype. Nucleotide sequence analyses
of parts of the HA and NA genes of the virus
allowed a phylogenetic comparison with other
influenza viruses. Our analyses confirmed that the
virus was of the H5N1 subtypes. Each of the eight
RNA segments wase of avian origin, and the virus
was highly pathogenic for chickens. The contribu-
tion of the influenza A H5N1 virus infection to the
child’s disease, eventually leading to death, was
complicated by the child’s treatment with aspirin.
The virus identification is important because it is
the first documented isolation of an influenza A
virus of this subtype from humans (15).
Characterization of the Human and
Chicken H5N1 Viruses from Hong Kong
Avian influenza outbreaks occurred in Hong
Kong from late March to early May of 1997. Three
chicken farms were separately affected; the
death rate for the total of 6,800 chickens exceeded
70%. A comparison between the nucleotide
sequences of the H5 genes from both the human
virus A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) (HK97) and a
representative of the chicken viruses from the
March outbreak, A/chicken/Hong Kong/258/97
(CkHK97), showed a high degree of homology in
their respective H5 HA1 sequences. Only three
amino-acid differences were observed in the HA1
of the HA, confirming the close phylogenetic
relationship between these viruses, belonging to
the Eurasian lineage of the subtype H5 viruses.
Sequence analyses of the HA of multiple
human and chicken H5N1 isolates show that they
form two subgroups with close linkage between
chicken and human isolates. An analysis of the
amino acids expected to be involved in the
assembly of the receptor binding site showed no
differences could be observed between the human
isolate and avian H5 viruses. Therefore, the H5
HA of HK97 had probably not acquired mutations
that favor binding to sialic acids with   2,6 linkage
to the galactoside over the   2,3 linked sialic acid
receptor preferred by human and avian viruses
respectively. However, the loss of a potential N-
linked glycosylation site at amino acid 156 Asn,
close to the receptor binding site, could affect
binding to the cellular receptor.
The amino acid sequence motif at the cleavage
site of the HA molecule has been associated with
high virulence of avian influenza viruses.
Experimental infection of chickens with HK97
showed that even after passaging in mammalian
cells (once in the child and twice in MDCK cells), the
virus remained highly pathogenic for chickens: all
eight chickens inoculated intratracheally with
MDCK-grown HK97 died within 3 days after
infection. A comparison of the reactivity of a panel
of 17 monoclonal antibodies (MAb) directed against
A/chicken/Pennsylvania/83 (H5N2) with HK97 and
CkHK97 in a hemagglutination inhibition assay
showed similar antigenic reactivities with all but
one MAb, indicating antigenic cross-reactivity
between these viruses and the usefulness of these
antibodies for diagnosis.
The fetuin-cleaving activity of the NA proved
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transcriptase polymerase chain reaction using
primer sets that amplified the 5' end of the NA
gene segments showed that this gene was of the
N1 genotype. Nucleotide sequence analysis and
comparison to published NA sequences con-
firmed this finding genetically. The NA se-
quences unequivocally showed a close molecular
relationship between HK97 and CkHK97, as a
unique 57-nucleotide deletion was observed in
the stalk region of the N1 gene of both viruses.
Each of the eight gene segments showed close
genetic homology between the HK97 and Ck/
HK97 viruses, the lowest being 98.2% for the
nucleoprotein; the remaining genes varied from
98.8% to 100% homology (16).
Can the Emergence of Pandemic Strains
Be Prevented?
Because all known influenza A virus
subtypes are found in aquatic wild birds in
nature, agricultural authorities have recom-
mended avoiding direct or indirect contact
between domestic poultry and wild birds. A
classic mistake made by chicken and turkey
farmers is to raise a few domestic ducks on a pond
near poultry barns; these birds attract wild
ducks. The highly pathogenic outbreaks of H5N2
avian influenza in chickens and turkeys in
Pennsylvania and surrounding states in 1983
to 1984 (12) and the H5N2 in Mexico in 1993 (7)
could probably have been prevented if domestic
poultry had been raised in ecologically
controlled houses with a high standard of
security and limited access.
If we assume that people, pigs, and aquatic
birds are the principal variables associated with
the emergence of new human pandemic stains,
human pandemics of influenza may be pre-
vented. The principles applied to preventing
outbreaks of influenza in domestic animals
should apply equally here. Pandemic strains of
human influenza emerge only rarely; however,
interspecies transmission of influenza viruses
may not be so rare, for up to 10% of persons with
occupational exposure to pigs develop antibodies
to swine influenza virus (17). Most transfers of
influenza viruses from pigs to humans are dead-
end transfers (they do not spread efficiently from
human to human). As indicated above, we do not
know the frequency of virus transfer between the
suspect species in southern China. If there is an
epicenter for pandemic influenza and a detect-
able frequency of transfer between people, pigs,
and ducks and if we understand the ecologic and
agricultural features involved in the transfer,
pandemics may be preventable. If pigs are the
major mixing vessel for influenza viruses,
changes in the agricultural practices that
separate pigs from people and ducks could
prevent future pandemics. Most importantly, we
may influence the appearance of pandemics by
changing the methods of live bird marketing by
separating chickens from other species, espe-
cially from aquatic birds.
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